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Abstract—As people rely on social media as their primary
sources of news, the spread of misinformation has become
a significant concern. In this large-scale study of news in
social media we analyze eleven million posts and investigate
propagation behavior of users that directly interact with news
accounts identified as spreading trusted versus malicious content.
Unlike previous work, which looks at specific rumors, topics,
or events, we consider all content propagated by various news
sources. Moreover, we analyze and contrast population versus
sub-population behaviour (by demographics) when spreading
misinformation, and distinguish between two types of propaga-
tion, i.e., direct retweets and mentions. Our evaluation examines
how evenly, how many, how quickly, and which users propagate
content from various types of news sources on Twitter.
Our analysis has identified several key differences in prop-
agation behavior from trusted versus suspicious news sources.
These include high inequity in the diffusion rate based on the
source of disinformation, with a small group of highly active users
responsible for the majority of disinformation spread overall
and within each demographic. Analysis by demographics showed
that users with lower annual income and education share more
from disinformation sources compared to their counterparts.
News content is shared significantly more quickly from trusted,
conspiracy, and disinformation sources compared to clickbait
and propaganda. Older users propagate news from trusted
sources more quickly than younger users, but they share from
suspicious sources after longer delays. Finally, users who interact
with clickbait and conspiracy sources are likely to share from
propaganda accounts, but not the other way around.
Index Terms—social network analysis, information propaga-
tion, disinformation, misinformation, deception.
I. INTRODUCTION
People use social media not only for entertainment and social
networking but also as their primary source of news and
information. An August 2017 survey from the Pew Research
Center found that 67% of Americans report that they get at
least some of their news from social media, an increase of 5%
over the previous year [1]. Of those who use Twitter, 74% said
they received news from the platform. With such a reliance on
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social media as a source of news and information, the spread
of misinformation is a significant concern.
Previous work in social media analysis, especially within the
area of social news, has focused on influence campaigns and
the spread of (mis)information either organically or through
bots. Given a particular event like an election or a natural
disaster, researchers typically follow information cascades to
tease out diffusion processes and infer various characteristics
about how social media responded to the event [2], [3].
These studies have resulted in important findings about the
effect of such items as information contagion [4], influence
campaigns [5], bots [6], and spam [7], etc., within specific
newsworthy events.
In the present work we take a different view. Rather than
studying information propagation one newsworthy event at
a time, we seek to quantify and compare socio-digital phe-
nomena according to the source of the information. This is
especially prescient in the current climate where the reliability
of traditional sources of news and information are contested.
For this we rely on previous work by Volkova et al. [8] that
aimed to classify information sources according to their quality
(i.e., their accuracy according to fact-checking organizations)
and their intent (i.e., whether the author intends to deceive the
reader or not). Along these two axes we focus on news sources
that fall into one of the following five categories: trusted,
clickbait, conspiracy theories, propaganda, and disinformation.
The goal of the present work is to quantify and compare the
immediate propagation of information from the different types
of news sources. In service of this goal we identified 282 news
sources on Twitter and collected 11 million direct interactions
(i.e., retweets and mentions) with those source accounts from
two million unique users. Unlike previous work, we report our
findings on information propagation behaviour from sources of
varying levels of credibility at the population level as well as
for various user-demographics. With this data and the news
source type classification, which is described in more detail
in the next section, we can quantify how social media users
interact with different types of news sources. This is the focus
of the four research questions outlined below.
RQ1: How evenly do users share content from news sources
of varying credibility?
Several previous studies have investigated the makeup of
users that retweet content from specific news sources as a way
to identify sources that spread rumors or disinformation. In the
context of social media, the 1% rule and its variants indicate
that most users only browse content while a mere 1% of users
contribute new content [9], [10]. Within the subset of those
who actively contribute new content, Kumar and Geethakumari
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2[11] found larger disparity among users who retweeted news
from sources identified as spreading disinformation. That is, a
small number of highly active users were responsible for the
vast majority of retweets of disinformation. However, fitting
the template of most social network research, the study focused
only on keywords related to the events in Egypt and Syria in
2013. To answer this research question more generally, the
present work quantifies and compares the disparity in sharing
behavior of millions of users across the various categories
of news sources. Specifically, for each type of news source
— clickbait, propaganda, etc., we ask whether information
sharing is equally distributed across users, or instead if there
are a small group of vocal users responsible for the majority
of the information propagation.
RQ2: How many users share content from different types
of news sources?
To identify rumor-spreading users, Rath et al. [12] proposed
an RNN model with believability scores to weight edges in a
user-retweet network. Believability scores for pairs of users
were calculated from the users’ scores of trustingness and
trustworthiness. They used the propensity of other users to
retweet a source as a proxy for the trustworthiness of the
source. Users were considered to be more trustworthy if more
users retweeted them, and users were considered more trusting
if they retweeted content from a larger number of other users.
Using a similar proxy for trustworthiness, we consider whether
deceptive sources can be identified by how trustworthy they
are, i.e., how many users retweet their posts.
RQ3: How quickly do users share from news sources of
each type?
Information diffusion studies have often used epidemio-
logical models to understand the diffusion of information,
both suspicious and trusted, among social media users [13],
[14], [15], [16]. These models were originally formulated to
model the spread of disease within a population. In the social
media context, users are considered to be “infected” when they
propagate information to other users. Jin et al. [13] modeled
diffusion using the SEIZ (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, and
Skeptics) model and compared ratios of the transition rates into
and out-of their “exposed” category, i.e., whether people are
exposed to misinformation faster than they spread it. Authors
found that users tend to share information about factual events
more quickly than misinformation or rumors (both verified
false or ambiguous in veracity). A recent study by Vosoughi
et al. [17] found that news fact-checked and found to be false
spread faster and to more people than news items found to be
true. Because our methodology considers all content directly
shared from various sources (rather than content about specific
events), we are able to determine whether deceptive or trusted
sources have slower immediate share-times overall.
RQ4: Who is sharing from different news sources?
Existing work focuses on user responses to rumor diffusion
as belief exchange that is caused by influence from friends,
e.g., the Tipping Model [18]. Wu et al. [19] combined content
analysis of rumor-tweets to detect false rumors on Weibo
as early as one day after the initial broadcast with 90%
confidence. Among their most important features was the type
of user performing the sharing. Ferrara [20] used a similar
classification and found those with high followings generated
highly-infectious cascades. Studies have also identified that
someone who believes in one conspiracy theory is also likely
to believe in others [21], [22]. Goertzel [21] found that ”young
people were slightly more likely to believe in conspiracy the-
ories” but belief was not significantly correlated with gender
or the level of education of the participants. Through our
analysis of a sample of users with inferred demographics,
we can identify whether there are different patterns in how
users interact with conspiracy sources. In the current work,
we focus on a broad question about user sharing behavior
to discover informative patterns within sub-populations not
only in the propagation of rumor versus non-rumor or a single
category of deceptive content but within interactions spreading
information from varying types of news-providers.
In order to tackle mis- and disinformation spread in social
networks, it is important to address motivations about why
people share deceptive news. Motivating factors can be psy-
chological (clickbait), political (propaganda, conspiracy, dis-
information), financial (clickbait, disinformation), and social
(conspiracy, propaganda) among others. By analyzing how
information from different types of deceptive news sources
is propagated across a social network, this study quantifies
how people share from news sources who spread misleading,
manipulated, or fabricated information; who these disinforma-
tion propagators are; and how much deceptive information is
being shared.
II. DATA COLLECTION AND ANNOTATION
In this section we describe how the news sources, the
population data, and the demographics data used in this study
were collected and annotated with source type labels.
A. News Source Labels
As previously discussed, we focus on news sources that fall
into one of five classes along a spectrum of varying credibility
levels. We define trusted news sources and each of the sub-
categories of deceptive news sources as follows:
Trusted news sources provide factual information with no
intent to deceive the audience, e.g., “Umberto Eco, Italian
semiotician and best-selling author, dies at 84 [URL] [URL]”.
Clickbait news sources use attention-grabbing, misleading, or
vague headlines such as “That’s about as tone deaf as it gets
right there. [URL]” to attract an audience.
Conspiracy theory news sources provide uncorroborated or
unreliable information to explain events or circumstances. For
example, “Video: Hoboken train wreck planned? [URL]”.
Propaganda news sources provide intentionally misleading
information to advance a social or political agenda, e.g., “The
evidence clearly shows that building new #nuclear power
plants will make global warming worse. [URL]”.
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Fig. 1: The number of tweets of the ten most frequently occurring news sources within each type as a function of their proportion of all
tweets of the given type. For example, anonews co is the 10th most frequently occurring clickbait source, but is responsible for only 0.03
% of the clickbait tweets. In contrast, the most frequent clickbait source theblaze is responsible for 43%. The 10th (ZeeNews) and most
frequent (el pais) trusted sources have a much smaller range in terms of shares of the trusted dataset with ZeeNews responsible for 3.5%
and el pais for 11.7%.
Disinformation news sources share fabricated and factually
incorrect information meant to deceive an audience. For ex-
ample, “The great cholesterol and statins con finally unravels:
[URL] #statins #cholesterol #heartdisease [URL]”.
Lists of news sources and their labels were previously
aggregated by Volkova et al. [8] through a combination
of crowd-sourcing and public resources. Authors manually
constructed a list of trusted news sources that were con-
firmed to have Twitter-verified accounts that posted content
in English. Deceptive news sources, i.e., clickbait, conspiracy,
and propaganda, were collected from several public resources
that annotate suspicious news accounts and their associated
websites.1 Labels for each of the sub-categories of deceptive
news sources were also manually verified to ensure quality.
Disinformation labels were collected from a unique source
of public data that comprises confirmed cases of disinforma-
tion campaigns: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/, which is also available
on Twitter through the @EUvsDisinfo account. Weekly reports
contain disinformation summaries with the countries and lan-
guages targeted, as well as the URLs of sources of disinfor-
mation, people and organizations who reported disinformation,
and manually generated disproofs (when applicable). We limit
our analysis to disinformation news accounts collected by the
European Union’s East Strategic Communications Task Force
between 2015 and 2016. As of November 2016, EUvsDisinfo
reports include almost 1,992 confirmed disinformation cam-
paigns found in news reports from around Europe and beyond.
B. Population Data
Our dataset, summarized in Table I, includes approximately
11 million tweets that either retweeted or @mentioned news
sources of varying degrees of credibility. We collected all
direct mentions of 282 sources over 13 months between
January 2016 and January 2017. Then, we assigned the
1Deceptive news lists used by Volkova et al [8] include: http://www.
fakenewswatch.com/, http://www.propornot.com/p/the-list.html.
TABLE I: Summary of our Twitter dataset: the number of news
sources, tweets, retweeting (RT) users, and @mentioned users for
each news-type and in total over the 13 months between 01/2016 –
01/2017.
Sources Tweets RT users @ users
Trusted (T) 182 6,567,002 1,423,227 390,164
Clickbait (CB) 11 40,347 19,361 6,002
Conspiracy (CS) 13 126,246 35,799 9,171
Propaganda (P) 26 609,251 233,799 34,532
Disinformation (D) 50 3,487,732 292,437 82,638
Total 282 10,819,357 1,784,655 471,967
category-label from each news source mentioned or retweeted
to each individual tweet. Figure 1 shows the relative size and
frequency of the ten most frequently occurring sources for
each news type in the dataset.
Distributions of tweet volume over time are illustrated in
Figure 2. Trusted and disinformation-spreading sources are
referenced and retweeted consistently across the entire year.
The other three deceptive types have concentrated peaks in
activity sharing or mentioning source accounts. Clickbait- and
Conspiracy-spreading sources both have a single peak in June
2016 (26%) and July 2016 (21%), respectively. Tweets that
reference or retweet propaganda-spreading sources were most
heavily posted in October and November 2016 (49%), with
another spike in July 2016 (17%).
Recent work has found that accounts spreading disinfor-
mation are significantly more likely to be automated ac-
counts [23]. However, in the current work we are interested in
the impact that news sources have in the system as a whole,
capturing the publicly visible responses to news sources by
all accounts — whether activity from that account is manual,
automated, or some mixture of both manual and automated
behavior. Therefore, we did not remove bots or automated
accounts from the population dataset. For the dataset we used
in our demographics-based analysis, described in the next
subsection, we focus specifically on personal accounts.
We did compare the news accounts and tweets captured
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Fig. 2: Tweet volume over the 13 months between 01/2016 – 01/2017.
The percentage of tweets within each source-type is plotted as a
function of the month posted or shared.
in our dataset with the list of Twitter accounts connected to
Russia’s “Internet Research Agency” recently released by the
US House Intelligence committee.2 However, because we are
focused primarily on sources of news (rather than specific
rumors or events), our dataset only contained 180 of the 2752
flagged-accounts, and only 4763 retweets; so we did not focus
on these accounts in particular in the current work.
C. Demographics Data
In addition to the population-level aggregate statistics, we
study information propagation and influence across various
user demographics. To accurately obtain user demographics
we curated a subset of non-organization user accounts that
generated enough information to render a demographic de-
scription with high confidence. To identify this sample, we first
restrict the dataset to users who 1) retweeted or @mentioned
deceptive news sources in at least 5 posts during the data
collection period, and 2) posted in English. This resulted in a
subset of 106,849 users. From this list we collected the 200
most recent tweets from Twitter’s public API. We used these
tweets and the Humanizr classifier to identify person-accounts,
which they defined as ”a personal account is one controlled by
an individual” [24]. This resulted in a sub-sample of 66,171
person accounts.
To infer user demographics, i.e., gender, age, income, and
education, we employed a demographic classifier trained on a
large, previously annotated Twitter dataset [25]. Specifically,
our demographic classifier relied on a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) architecture initialized with 200-dimensional
2https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/exhibit b.pdf
GLOVE embedding vectors pre-trained on Twitter tokens [26].
Following previous methodology, each demographic-attribute
was assigned one of two mutually exclusive classes [25]. For
example, we classified gender as either male (M) or female (F),
age as either younger than 25 (Y) or 25 and older (O), income
as below (B) or at and above (A) $35,000 a year, and education
as having only a high school education (H) or at least some
college education (C). The area under the ROC curve (AUC)
for 10-fold cross-validation experiments were 0.89 for gender,
0.72 for age, 0.72 for income, and 0.76 for education.
These are the state-of-the-art results for user demographics
prediction on Twitter, an improvement on performance of
previous models that used the same dataset [27].
Users in this dataset were primarily predicted to be male
(96%), older (95%), with higher incomes (81%), college-
educated (82%), and classified as regular users (59%). It is
important to note that our user sample is representative of
those users who frequently interact with deceptive source
accounts. It is not a balanced sample of global demography or
a representative sample of Twitter itself. In fact, a survey by the
Pew Research Center in 2016 found that only 17% of Twitter
users had a high school education or less, 38% were between
18 and 29 years old, and 47% were male [28]. Each reported
category was less skewed towards the majority class in our
demographic attributes than we found in the sample of users
who frequently interacted with deceptive source accounts.
We also include each user’s role in their network based on
the friend and follower counts collected from user metadata.
For this analysis we borrow the leader/follower heuristic to
assign a user as an opinion leader (L) if they are followed
by more users than they follow or a regular user (R) if they
follow more users than they have followers [19].
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the methodology used to analyze
propagation behavior of news content and misinformation
across and within the five types of sources identified. Again,
we focus on propagation at the source level rather than the
content or individual tweet level. We consider propagation of
all content, deceptive or not, from sources of each type.
RQ1: How evenly do users share content from news sources
of varying credibility?
To answer this question we compare the distributions of how
users share information using three measures commonly used
to measure income inequality: Lorenz curves, Gini coeffi-
cients, and Palma ratios. Rather than measure how much of
the total population’s income each individual is responsible
for, we repurpose these metrics to measure how much of the
total tweet volume each user is responsible for. This allows
us to compare propagation inequality across source types the
way economists compare income inequality across countries.
Lorenz curves have traditionally been used to illustrate the
distribution of income or wealth graphically [29]. In those
domains, the curves plot the cumulative percentage of wealth,
income, or some other variable to be compared against the cu-
mulative (in increasing shares) percentage of a corresponding
population. The degree to which the curve deviates from the
5straight diagonal (y = x) representative of perfect equality
represents the inequality present in the distribution. In our
case, the Lorenz curve is adapted to illustrate the cumulative
percentage of propagation (tweets shared) as a function of the
cumulative percentage of users posting, as shown in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients. As a graphical repre-
sentation of income inequality within a population, Lorenz curves
plot the share of income by the cumulative share of the population.
Lorenz curves that measure the inequality in propagation plot the
share of total propagation, i.e., the y% of tweets posted, by the share
of the population who propagated, i.e., the cumulative x% of active
users. The Gini coefficient is the proportion of the area under the
line of perfect equality (a1 + a2) that is captured between the line
of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve (a1). (RQ1)
The Gini coefficient is defined as the proportion of the area
under the line of perfect equality that is captured above the
Lorenz curve, i.e., a1a1+a2 in Figure 3. The Gini coefficients
reported in subsequent sections are calculated using the for-
mula in Eq. (1), which is an approximation of the points of the
Lorenz curves observed in the collected data. Using income
for our example, Gini coefficients can grow to be greater than
1 but only if individuals within a population can be responsible
for negative proportions, e.g., if individuals can have negative
incomes. In our data, users must be responsible for at least 1
share in order to be considered part of the dataset, so the Gini
coefficients have an upper-bound of 1.
Gˆ = 1−
n∑
k=1
(Xk −Xk−1)(Yk + Yk−1) (1)
The third measure we consider is the Palma ratio. It is
defined as the ratio of the share of the top 10% to the bottom
40% of users in the population. Again, using income as our
example, in perfect equality each individual in the population
is responsible for an equal amount, e.g., an equal share of
income, resulting in a Palma ratio of 1/4. The Palma ratio
was formulated as another measure of inequality because the
Gini coefficient is most sensitive to changes in the middle,
which is relatively stable [30]. The Palma ratio, on the other
hand, is sensitive to changes at the extremes.
We use the Gini coefficient, Palma ratio, and the Lorenz
curves to provide a balanced understanding of the inequalities
in the distributions of how information is spread online across
the five types of news sources.
RQ2: How many users share content from different types
of news sources?
To answer this question we measure the size of the Twitter
audience that directly retweets content as a measure of source
influence. We compare the distributions of and the average
number of users who propagate content posted by sources for
each source type. This allows us to measures how large of a
direct response each source post causes across source types.
When we consider the results at the user level, we compare
the behavior of each sub-population of users.
RQ3: How quickly do users share from news sources of
each type?
To answer this question we measure the speed by which users
share content with their followers. Specifically, we measure the
delay from the original tweet from the news source to the time
of the retweet. It is important to note that it is not the goal of
the present work to measure the entire cascade of information
propagation; rather, we are interested in direct retweets of news
source accounts and, therefore, only collect these specific share
events. To compensate for these methodological decisions, we
borrow similar statistics from recent work that measured all
share events [31]. We can then draw conclusions by comparing
our measurements of direct shares against the global aggregate.
RQ4: Who is sharing from different news sources?
To answer this question at an aggregate level we look at user
overlap and user-network similarities across the five types
of news sources. We hypothesize that there will be large
overlaps with trusted sources for the sets of users interacting
with sources identified as spreading deceptive content, but
that this overlap will probably not be symmetric. That is,
that users who spread content from suspicious sources may
also spread content from trusted sources. However, users who
spread content from trusted sources may be less likely to also
spread content from suspicious sources.
Then, we compare source types by certain social network
statistics including density, edges to nodes ratios, or average
indegree, outdegree, shortest path length, etc. Each source is
represented as its own social graph (sub-network). Nodes in
each graph represent users who retweeted or @mentioned the
news source, or who were @mentioned (using @user) in a
tweet connected to the source (through an @mention or a
retweet of the source by another user). Edges represent the
links between these users on a per-source basis. Specifically,
we draw an edge between users x and y if x retweets y, x
includes @y in a tweet, or z mentions both @x and @y in
the same tweet.
We also measure shares across various user demographics
and five news source types. We present the results of Mann
Whitney U (MWU) tests to identify statistically significant
differences in who is sharing information for each type of
news, along with common language effect sizes to illustrate
the magnitude of those differences.
6IV. DECEPTION PROPAGATION RESULTS: POPULATION
LEVEL
We first look at the behavior of users spreading information
from each type of news source at the population level. Here
we present the results of experiments that use the large dataset
of almost 11 million tweets over the course of 2016. We
compare and contrast how evenly, how much, how quickly,
and who shares content within and across user sub-populations
interacting with different types of news sources — trusted,
clickbait, conspiracy, propaganda, and disinformation.
RQ1: How evenly do users share content from news sources
of varying credibility?
Across all types, including trusted sources, we see large
diffusion inequality. We find that a relatively small subset of
users are responsible for a large proportion of each sources’
shares. However, these inequalities are not equal across news
source types. To look at information propagation inequality
for each source type overall, we use each source-user pair
as a single propagation unit in the propagation frequency
distributions used to generate Lorenz curves and calculate Gini
coefficients and Palma ratios for each source type.
We illustrate the inequalities in the propagation of each
source type with their respective Lorenz curves in Figure 4.
The curve for perfect equality is also included for easy
comparison not only across news types but within the context
of best and worst cases. We see that, for direct retweets, the
Lorenz curve for disinformation sources is the furthest from
the line of perfect equality. There is a significant gap (p <
0.01) between it and the next closest Lorenz curve (conspiracy
sources). Except for conspiracy theory sources which are more
equally diffused, the arrangement of Lorenz curves for each
source type from closest to furthest from perfect equality is the
same for @mentions as for retweets. While Lorenz curves for
@mention tweets are more closely plotted around the curve for
propaganda sources, there is still significantly more inequality
in the propagation of disinformation sources (p < 0.01).
Table II presents the Gini coefficients and Palma ratios
for each news type. Again, we see the greatest inequality in
retweet diffusion for disinformation sources, although much
lower for @mentions of those sources than direct retweets. The
10% most active users who directly retweet disinformation-
spreading sources share 20.13 times as many tweets as the
least active 40%, compared to around 2 - 6 times as much for
each of the other source types. This ratio drops to 6.49 for
@mentions of disinformation sources.
TABLE II: Gini coefficients and Palma ratios for direct retweets
(RT) from or tweets that @mention sources (@) for each news type,
averaged across sources using source-user combinations as diffusion
units. Higher values mean more inequality. (RQ1)
GINI COEFFICIENT PALMA RATIO
Source-Type RT @ RT @
Trusted 0.57 0.56 3.68 3.52
Clickbait 0.40 0.46 1.91 2.37
Conspiracy 0.67 0.49 5.95 2.73
Propaganda 0.48 0.49 2.61 2.71
Disinformation 0.83 0.68 20.13 6.49
Shares of @mention propagation are more equally dis-
tributed among users than direct retweets for trusted, con-
spiracy, and disinformation. Direct retweet of clickbait and
propaganda sources are more evenly shared by users than
@mentions, but only slightly. The Gini coefficients also il-
lustrate the larger inequality gap for disinformation sources
that we saw with the Lorenz curves, reaching 0.83 for direct
retweets. All other source types except for direct retweets of
conspiracy sources have Gini coefficients below the minimum
coefficient for a Pareto 80:20 distribution (0.60). Interestingly,
we see that clickbait and propaganda sources are more evenly
propagated than trusted sources. The more-even distribution
of clickbait articles is not surprising — the whole point of
clickbait articles is to motivate many people to click and share
the articles.
We also compared the Gini coefficients and Palma ratios of
individual sources. The only statistically significant findings
(p < 0.01) were in the differences between disinformation-
spreading sources and all other types of news sources. In
particular, disinformation sources had higher Gini coefficients
than trusted sources in 63% of comparisons, and propaganda
sources in 66% of comparisons. Using Palma ratios, dis-
information sources had higher ratios than trusted sources
and propaganda sources in 72% and 75% of comparisons,
respectively. These results show that the volume of retweets
for disinformation sources are more unevenly distributed than
trusted or propaganda sources; these results also demonstrate
that the unevenness of distribution is more heavily evident in
the extremes of the distributions — among the 10% most and
40% least active users.
RQ2: How many users share content from different types
of news sources?
We compared the mean number of users who retweet each
source post and found that the 95% confidence intervals of
those means overlap for all source type comparisons except
between conspiracy and disinformation sources. This is not
unexpected because the retweet distributions are so heavily
skewed. Long tails may heavily influence the means. However,
we found that the distributions of the number of users who
retweet each source post for trusted and disinformation sources
differ significantly (p < 0.05). Further, when we compare the
distributions of the mean number of users who retweeted each
source tweet for each of the sources, we also see statistically
significant differences (p = 0.03) where the mean number of
users who retweeted a disinformation source is greater than
that of a trusted source in 60% of comparisons. Disinformation
sources have, on average, more users retweet each source post.
Figure 5 illustrates the distributions of the number of users
who retweet each source tweet for the five most frequently
retweeted sources of each type. We see a clear difference in
the behavior of trusted sources and disinformation sources.
Disinformation sources show a significant shift in the bulk of
source tweets compared to the other source types. The same
shift is seen in the most popular propaganda source. These
sources have a greater proportion of their tweets retweeted
by a larger number of users than the other types of sources,
including trusted news. As expected, the number of users who
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Fig. 4: Lorenz curves of the propagation inequality for each source type, averaged across sources using user-source pairs instead of users as
diffusion units. Propagation using direct retweets at left and @mention tweets at right. The lorenz curve representative of perfect equality is
also included for reference. (RQ1)
retweet is closely correlated with the number of source tweets
(Pearson = 0.76, p < 0.01).
RQ3: How quickly do users share from news sources of
each type?
Next, we study how quickly users share direct retweets com-
pared to tweets that @mention source accounts. We find that,
as expected, the majority of retweets occur within 24 hours of
the original tweet being posted, regardless of whether the share
was a direct retweet or an @mention of a source. Although
previous work found longer delays when deceptive content
like rumor is propagated compared to verified news [13], these
trends did not appear for all types of deceptive sources when
we considered all content posted, i.e., deceptive sources may
post both deceptive and non-deceptive content.
Delays of retweets from suspicious sources are, on average,
longer than for trusted sources; however, their 95% confidence
intervals overlap. When we examine cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of delays for each source type, shown in
Figure 6, we observe some statistically significant differences
(MWU p < 0.01) in how long users wait before they retweet
from a specific type of deceptive source. Users retweet from
trusted, conspiracy, and disinformation sources after similarly
short delays (soon after content is posted). However, users
who retweet from clickbait sources wait significantly longer
(p < 0.01) after the sources post content. Those who retweet
propaganda sources wait the longest after original postings
(p < 0.01).
There are noticeable differences between @mention tweets
and direct retweets. A much larger percentage of @mention
tweets are shared within the first hour after the original posting
occurs than the content retweeted directly from a source for all
source types. This would also include content originally posted
that was then retweeted by at least one other user before being
retweeted again with the source account mentioned within
the retweet, e.g., through the use of RT@source. Diffusion
delays for tweets that @mention disinformation sources in the
body of the tweet appear to skew toward shorter delays in the
bottom plot of Figure 6 than those mentioning trusted sources.
TABLE III: Overlaps of user accounts who retweeted multiple news
source types. x in row i and column j means that x% of users who
retweeted j-sources also retweeted i-sources. (RQ4)
T CB CS P D
Trusted (T) 100 68 60 41 27
Clickbait (CB) 1 100 8 3 1
Conspiracy (CS) 2 15 100 7 3
Propaganda (P) 7 39 43 100 9
Disinformation (D) 6 17 23 11 100
However, MWU tests found the distributions did not differ
significantly.
RQ4: Who is sharing from different news sources?
Finally, we look at who shared content from sources at
an aggregate level. For this, we compared the overlap of
users across all types of news sources. Table III shows these
intersections as a percentage of the set of users who shared
content from the column’s type of sources. This measurement
approximates the likelihood that users who interacted with
sources of the column’s type also interacted with sources of
the row’s type.
We see the highest intersections with trusted sources for all
types of deceptive sources. That is, 68%, 60%, 41%, and 27%
of users who retweeted information from clickbait, conspiracy,
propaganda, and disinformation sources, respectively, also
shared information from trusted sources. Intuitively, this makes
sense because the mainstream trusted sources are likely to post
a more general or broad range of content than the other types
of sources which may be more targeted toward a niche set of
users or viewpoints.
We see an interesting overlap between propaganda, click-
bait, and conspiracy sources. There is a high proportion of
users who shared from clickbait-sources (39%) or conspiracy-
sources (43%) who also propagated information from propa-
ganda sources. However, relatively few users who shared from
propaganda sources also shared from clickbait or conspiracy
sources — only 3% and 7%, respectively. Users who retweeted
clickbait and conspiracy sources are fairly likely to have
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Fig. 5: Distributions of the number of source tweets with a given
number of users who retweeted for the five most frequently occurring
sources in each type. More frequently occurring sources are plotted
in darker shades. This figure is best viewed in color. (RQ2)
retweeted propaganda sources, but not the other way around.
In fact, users who retweeted clickbait and conspiracy sources
are the most likely to have also retweeted other source types.
We then studied social graphs of users who directly inter-
acted with each type of news sources. We compare network
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Fig. 6: CDF plots of diffusion delays (in hours) by news type for
direct retweets (top) and retweets with @mentions of the source
account (bottom). The inset of each plot shows a closer view of
the initial diffusion, highlighted with a box in the larger plot. (RQ3)
statistics of each set of graphs and report key novel findings
below:
• The density (i.e., edge to node ratio) of propaganda
networks are significantly different from trusted networks
(p < 0.01).
• The density, average in-degree, and average out-degree of
trusted networks differ from conspiracy theory networks
(p < 0.05) and propaganda networks (p < 0.01).
• Average shortest path lengths of disinformation networks
differ significantly from trusted (p < 0.01), conspiracy
theory (p < 0.05), and propaganda networks (p < 0.05).
V. DECEPTION PROPAGATION RESULTS:
BY DEMOGRAPHICS
In this section we report how evenly, how much, how
quickly, and who shares content from news sources across
and within each source type in context of the predicted user
demographics of our sample of 66,171 users who actively
engage with deceptive news sources.
RQ1: How evenly do users share content from news sources
of varying credibility?
As we found at the population level, there is a relatively
small group of users who share more than others. This is
also reflected in the Gini coefficients and Palma ratios for
all source type and demographic combinations in Table IV.
9TABLE IV: Gini coefficients and Palma ratios for each demographic attribute, averaged for each source type using source-user combinations
as diffusion units. * denotes that a large majority (> 75%) of users were classified as the given demographic. Cells are highlighted based on
the Gini coefficients (top) or the ratio of the Palma ratio to the perfect equality ratio of 0.25 (bottom). This figure is best viewed in color.
(RQ1)
GINI COEFFICIENTS
Gender Age Income Education Role
(Source-Type) M* F Y O* B A* H C* R L
Trusted 0.61 0.52 0.44 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.58
Clickbait 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.45 0.36 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.36
Conspiracy 0.69 0.34 0.46 0.69 0.73 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.72 0.65
Propaganda 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.55
Disinformation 0.87 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.75 0.88 0.78 0.88 0.85
PALMA RATIOS
Gender Age Income Education Role
(Source-Type) M* F Y O* B A* H C* R L
Trusted 4.47 3.08 2.18 4.48 4.67 4.35 4.09 4.49 4.80 4.00
Clickbait 1.72 1.40 1.37 1.72 2.38 1.66 2.19 1.68 1.79 1.65
Conspiracy 6.58 1.44 2.28 6.58 8.75 6.00 8.88 6.02 7.73 5.37
Propaganda 3.58 3.04 2.91 3.58 4.41 3.39 4.17 3.45 3.74 3.42
Disinformation 25.06 18.03 41.34 18.15 35.49 08.99 35.52 10.66 28.26 21.29
When we compare content shares from trusted (T) sources,
we see the greatest differences between users in different age
brackets. The biggest differences between sub-populations,
however, occur between users who share from conspiracy
and disinformation sources. Men who shared from conspiracy
sources did so much more unevenly than women who shared
from these sources, with an 84% higher Palma ratio. A similar
pattern occurs between users of different incomes; the Palma
ratio is 2.95 times higher for users with higher incomes than
users with incomes below $35,000.
As highlighted in Table IV, the Palma ratios for disinfor-
mation sources are consistently higher than all other source
types. The greatest differences in equality at the extremes of
the distribution of active users is seen in younger users where
the most active 10% propagate 41.34 times as much as the
least active 40%. Disinformation sources are heavily retweeted
by a slight proportion of the populations of younger users,
users with lower incomes, and users with only a high school
education who retweet a disinformation source at least once.
RQ2: How many users share content from different types
of news sources?
Next, we look at how many users within each demographic
sub-population shared individual posts from sources of each
type. In Table V, we see that there are statistically significant
differences (MWU p < 0.01) in how many users retweeted
each source post or post that @mentioned sources of each
type. The demographic that had more users share each post is
almost always the demographic which the majority of users
were predicted to have (male, older, income above $32,000,
or college-educated). In one exception we find that users with
income below $35,000 (in 81% of comparisons) or with only
a high school education (in 75% of comparisons) comprise
the dominant share of users who shared individual posts
from disinformation sources, despite there being fewer users
predicted to have these attributes.
RQ3: How quickly do users share from news sources of
each type?
We compare the speed with which each demographic shares
content posted by each type of source. CDFs of diffusion
delays for each demographic (not illustrated) resulted in plots
similar to those found in Figure 6. Table VI illustrates which
demographic takes a longer time to propagate content.
TABLE V: Demographic where more users shared each individual
source post from sources of a given type with the common language
effect size (as % of comparisons) for each attribute. Statistical
significance from MWU tests of p < 0.01 for all results. (RQ2)
Source-Type Gender Age Income Education Role
Trusted M 94 O 98 A 61 C 68 W 34
Clickbait M 94 O 96 A 70 C 74 R 40
Conspiracy M 99 O 98 A 56 C 58 W 41
Propaganda M 93 O 90 A 58 C 63 R 40
Disinformation M 96 O 43 B 81 H 75 W 45
Except for comparisons between predicted gender or age
brackets for users who retweet clickbait sources, we find
significant differences in diffusion delays for direct retweets
for all other news source types. Users predicted to have only
high school education directly retweet news sources of all
types faster than those with a college education. Men retweet
from sources more quickly than women for all source types
except clickbait. Users with predicted income below $35,000,
predicted to have only a high school education, or who are
“regular” users share content from clickbait sources faster than
their counterparts. Interestingly, we see that while older users
will retweet trusted sources more quickly than younger users,
there is a greater delay when they retweet the most suspicious
sources — conspiracy, propaganda, or disinformation, relative
to the delays of younger users.
On the other hand, we see fewer occurrences of significant
differences between sub-populations when users retweet con-
tent that only @mention the source rather than directly retweet
it. Users with different predicted genders and age brackets now
share tweets that @mention clickbait sources after different
delays. Users predicted to be men, older, college-educated,
or to have incomes below $35,000 will share tweets that
@mention clickbait sources faster than their counterparts, but
only slightly (effect size of 54-59%).
RQ4: Who is sharing from different news sources?
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TABLE VI: Users by demographics who directly retweet from or
@mention news source types after a longer delay and common
language effect size (as %). A dash (—) is shown if no significant
differences were found. All results are statistically significant (MWU
tests of p < 0.01). (RQ3)
a. Direct retweets from news sources
Source-Type Gender Age Income Education Role
Trusted F 53 Y 56 A 52 C 51 R 49
Clickbait —— —— A 54 C 52 L 52
Conspiracy F 58 O 55 A 62 C 61 L 51
Propaganda F 52 O 57 A 56 C 55 R 52
Disinformation F 51 O 50 A 56 C 52 L 50
b. Retweets with @mentions of news sources
Source-Type Gender Age Income Education Role
Trusted F 54 Y 53 —— —— R 56
Clickbait F 54 Y 58 B 59 H 59 ——
Conspiracy —— —— —— —— R 53
Propaganda F 53 —— A 53 C 53 R 52
Disinformation F 54 O 56 A 56 C 56 R 50
Finally, we study who is sharing in terms of the predicted
user demographics. Table VII presents the demographic that
is more likely to directly retweet each source type at least once.
We see that older users are less likely than younger users to
share content from a disinformation source, but more likely for
any other type of news. Similar patterns occur in users pre-
dicted to have higher versus lower income or education levels
(who may also be older). When we consider the predicted
gender, we see a similar trend where women are more likely
to share content at least once from disinformation sources and
less likely than men for all other types of suspicious sources.
However, women are no less or more likely than men to share
content from trusted sources. We did not find any significant
differences in demographics for @mentions.
TABLE VII: Demographics more likely to share a direct RT from a
source of a given type at least once. For each attribute, the demo-
graphic with the higher likelihood is listed if statistically significant
(MWU p < 0.01) with the common language effect size (as %). A
dash (—) stands for cells if no significant difference is found. (RQ4)
Source-Type Gender Age Income Education Role
Trusted F 26 O 26 B 24 H 24 L 23
Clickbait M 05 O 05 A 05 C 05 ——
Conspiracy M 14 O 15 A 14 C 14 L 14
Propaganda M 36 O 37 A 33 C 32 L 26
Disinformation —— Y 32 B 28 H 28 L 15
VI. SUMMARY
Our extensive large-scale population-level and demograph-
ics analysis of the propagation behavior of users who directly
interact with different types of news sources identified several
key differences. Some characteristics, like diffusion inequality
and the number of users who retweet per post, show large
differences between trusted and disinformation news sources.
Other results highlight key differences between propaganda,
clickbait, and conspiracy news sources. Together, these novel
results may be used to differentiate news sources of varying
degrees of credibility without the need for expensive content-
level annotation.
Recall that this paper explores four research questions at the
population-level and across various demographics. A summary
of our novel findings is presented below.
RQ1: How evenly do users share content from news sources
of varying credibility?
• Population: Direct retweets of disinformation sources are
most highly retweeted from a small group of users that
actively engage with those sources regularly. Propaganda
is the next most unevenly shared news, followed by
trusted news, conspiracy, and clickbait.
• By demographics: We find striking differences in sharing
behavior across different user demographics. The largest
imbalance is in the most active 10% of young users,
which retweet disinformation sources 41.34 as much as
the least active 40%.
RQ2: How many users share content from different types
of news sources?
• Population: We did not find statistically significant differ-
ences between the number of users that retweet suspicious
news across source types. The exception to this finding
was disinformation sources, which have a higher number
of users who retweet each post compared to trusted
sources.
• By demographics: Users, on average, with an annual
income below $35,000 (in 81% of comparisons) or high
school-educated users (in 75% of comparisons) share
content from disinformation sources more often than their
counterparts.
RQ3: How quickly do users share from news sources of
each type?
• Population: Trusted, conspiracy, and disinformation
sources have similarly short delays between the time a
source posts content and the time that users share it. De-
lays are significantly longer for clickbait and propaganda
sources (p < 0.01).
• By demographics: Older users retweet trusted sources
more quickly than younger users. Younger users share
the most suspicious sources (conspiracy, propaganda, and
disinformation) more quickly than older users.
RQ4: Who is sharing from different news sources?
• Population: Users who share information from clickbait
and conspiracy news sources are also likely to also share
from propaganda sources, but not the other way around.
• By demographics: Users who are within the majority
predicted demographics are more likely to share at least
once from all types of sources except disinformation,
where the minority demographics is more likely to share.
We found no significant results for which demographics
are more likely to @mention sources.
VII. LIMITATIONS
It is important to highlight some of the limitations in
our study. First, the data samples used were not random
samples nor representative of the overall Twitter population.
It is important to note that we do not make claims about
the behavior of all Twitter users. We instead focus on the
behavior of users who share information from deceptive
news sources identified as conspiracy, propaganda, clickbait
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and disinformation. Second, the demographic labels were
assigned by an imperfect classifier (even though state-of-the-
art performance has been achieved). Some of the demographic
classes had AUROC rates of 0.72. It is unclear if there is a
classification bias in one direction or another. Nevertheless, we
caution the reader against making strong claims for individual
demographic classes.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To summarize, this is the first study that reports novel
observable differences of information spread at the news
account level used to understand re-sharing behavior from
sources of varying degrees of credibility in social media.
More specifically, this work quantifies how people share
misleading, manipulated, or potentially fabricated information
from social media news sources; who these propagators are;
and how much and how evenly deceptive information is being
shared. The properties we highlight in the previous section
are differences in the way users directly interact with news
sources that could be used to differentiate sources of varying
credibility or trustworthiness without the need for tweet level
annotation of deceptive versus trusted content or third-party
source annotations.
The results of our findings can be used to inform many
practical applications including but not limited to: informing
models and simulations of deceptive content spread across
languages, geolocations, specific groups of users with different
demographics and interests e.g., gatekeepers or persistent
groups, and types of content e.g., deceptive posts during
natural disasters or health messaging campaigns. These models
can in turn be used to identify sources of varying credibility, or
sources which require further investigation into credibility. For
example, such a model that tags trusted versus deceptive, or
potentially deceptive, sources could be used to guide not only
the general public when they consume information from social
news sources but journalists and fact-checkers who focus on
verifying news sources and information being spread.
Our analysis focuses on first-hop spreaders of deceptive
news content in one social media platform and could natu-
rally be extended to measure how information spreads from
deceptive news sources beyond the first hop across many
social environments. One could construct information cas-
cades initiated by immediate-hop spreaders and measure how
deceptive news propagate. For example, how deep deceptive
news travel, how broad they go, how many unique users they
reach, how many total users they affect, how long does it
take for them to reach the audience of a certain size, how
deceptive news evolves while being re-shared, or what the
mechanisms of re-sharing are e.g., retweets, quotes, comments
etc. Another interesting application could be to evaluate how
the same deceptive news content, that is potentially seeded
by adversaries, propagates across different social platforms
e.g., Twitter, Reddit vs. Facebook. Moreover, understanding
the intent behind misleading and fabricated news spread is
another practical application of our analysis, that goes beyond
rumor propagation work. In general, analyzing different types
of online social behavior relevant to information spread e.g.,
information campaigns, coordinated effort, competing cam-
paigns, recurrence, intimidation campaigns etc. is not only
critical for national security but would also ensure healthier
interactions and boost the level of trust in social media.
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